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CHAPTER I
MATRIMONIUM
Marriage among the Romans could occur at quite an
early age, according to modern standards.
be arranged at any age above seven. 1

Bethrothal might

The custom of early

bethrothal and marriage certainly tended to discourage any
romantic inclinations.

If one did marry for love, general-

ly it was with a widow or divorcee.

The possibility of sen-

timental attachment among the very young was slight, but
marriage to the Romans was not for love, but for duty to
the state.

Often the Romans had to rely on a post-marital

propinquity for the development of love which normally precedes marriage.

Seneca advises a wise man to

love his wife with the head, not
with the heart, [for] . . . nothing is more hateful than to love
one's wife as one loves one's mistress. 2
Lucre was of ten another important reason for the
Romans to marry.

Generally girls without

fortun~,but

theless beautiful, had a hard time securing a husband.

neverYet

the lot of a suitor who made a rich marriage was not always a happy one.

The wife had much control over her hus-

band, for he could not alienate any of the dowry or contract

2

away any without the wife's consent.
to his wife's fortune.

He was thus a slave

"Si illa tibi placet, placenda dos

quoque est quam dat tibi.
illud quod non vis feres. 113

Postremo quod vis non duces, nisi
In reference to this same idea

Juvenal said " • . . Optima set quare Censennia teste marito
bis quingena dedit:

tanti vocat ille pudicam. 114

Procreation was another important reason for the
Romans to marry.

In fact, the government offered very lucra-

tive incentives to encourage procreation, because more children meant more Roman citizens and if male children then more
soldiers.

If a person were married but childless he was

forbidden to receive

more than one-half his legacy unless

the testator stood within the sixth degree. 5

A man escaped

penalty if he had one child, a free woman if she had three
and a freed woman if she had four.

If a wife were child-

less she could only claim a tenth of that part of the husband's will that he assigned to her.

Mothers of three or

four children were also entitled to freedom from tutela guardianship over herself

and her property.

Persons with

children were also exempt from various disagreeable civil
duties.

Candidates for public office were given preference

according to their number of children. 6
For all of these reasons, marriage was greatly encouraged among the Romans.

Augustus also encouraged marri-

age through additional legislation.

It was decreed that if

men were not married by the age of 25 and women_ by 20 they

3

were to be penalized.

The laws favored the married and dis-

favored the celibate.

Celibates were forbidden to receive

legacies unless they were related to the testator in at
least the sixth degree.
tions.

There were however a few excep-

They could receive the legacy if they married with-

in 100 days or if an engagement was made to marry and executed within a two year period.

Widows were exempt for two

years and divorcees for eighteen months
pressured to remarry.

before they were

Tiberius said that when a man reached

sixty and a woman fifty they were to be considered celibates for life if they were unrnarried. 7

These penalties

for celibacy and childlessness endured for centuries until
they were abolished by Constantine and later Christian
emperors, for Christian law did not favor remarriage, although

it was not prohibited. 8
Sponsalia
Roman marriages generally were preceded by betro-

thal or engagement, which was a reciprocal promise between
the intending husband or father and the girl's father or
guardian.

The consent of the woman (girl) was unnecessary,

especially if she was under her father's power, and too it
was considered improper for a young woman to promise herself.

She was always given by the paterfamilias, or in the

case of no paterfamilias, she was given by one of her relatives.

Betrothal promises took the form of sponsio,and

originally the contract was enforceable if either party

4
reneged on the engagement agreement.

Most likely this ac-

tion ceased long before the end of the Republic, for the
Romans felt it was immoral to allow an action for a breach
of promise to marry.
greement to marry.

Betrothal became just an informal aMade in writing and before witnesses,

the agreement was easily renounced by either party with the
formula condicione tua non utor. 9

The betrothal

gifts gen-

erally were not of enough significance to warrant proceedings for restoration.
The betrothal agreement, however, did place restrictions on an individual.

Sexual intercourse with another

man made the engaged girl actionable for adultery, and from
the moment of betrothal the relatives of the pair had the
status of in-laws. 10

A man was liable for infamia if he

were concurrently a party in two different engagements. 11
Through Christianity, the law concerning betrothal was
changed and by the fourth century A.D. the fiancee gave the
girl a gift, arra sponsalicia, to guarantee betrothal.

If

he did not marry her he gave up claim to the gift, and if
she refused to marry him she had to return fourfold, later
double, the monetary value of the gift. 12
Matrimonii Impedimenta
Betrothal did not guarantee one the right to marry,
for there were certain restrictions and requirements pertaining to a Roman marriage.

In order to have iustae

nuptiae or iustum matrimonium the parties must have conubium,

5

the right to enter into a true marriage.

The right of

conubium was possessed by all Roman citizens and certain
others to whom the government might grant the privilege.
Iustum matrimonium est, si inter
eos, qui nuptias contrahunt, conubium sit, et tam masculus pubes
quam femina potens sit, et utrique
consentiant, si sui iuris sint,
aut etiam parentis eorum, si in
potestate sunt. Conubium est
uxoris iure ducendae facultas.
Conubium habent cives Romani cum
civibus Romanis; cum Latinis autem
et peregrinnis ita, si concessum
sit. Cum servis nullum est conbium.13
Also certain bars existed which further prevented
certain marriages:

(i) There was a minimum age requirement

for marriage based generally on puberty.
was twelve.

For girls the age

There is some dispute concerning boys.

The

Sabinians felt that the boy should have reached puberty
and that a physical examination was necessary, while the
Proculians demanded only that the boy be fourteen.
latter school of thought has been the prevelant one.
(ii)

Both parties must be of sound mind.

This

14

(iii} According

to Augustus' statute, senators and their sons could not
have iustae nuptiae with a freedwoman or any other undignified woman, nor could a woman of senatorial rank marry a
man of lower rank.

(iv) Roman officials in a province

were forbidden to marry women of that same province.
(v) Not until Septimus Severus could soldiers of ordinary
rank marry during their time of service;

even if a child

were conceived before one's entry into the service and
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born while one was in the service, the child was not considered to be a product of iusta nuptia. 15

(vi} According

to the Digest 23.2, guardians were not allowed to marry their
wards. 16
There were also certain degrees of relationship
which made marriage impossible:

(vii)

Originally any blood

relationship nearer than and including first cousins was
forbidden, but by the end of the third century B.C. marriage
between first cousins was allowed.
Inter eas enim personas quae
parentum liberorumve locum inter
se optinent nuptiae contrahi non
possunt, nee inter eas conubiurn
est, veluti inter patrem et filiam,
~el inter matrem et filium, 1 7e1
inter avum et neptem . . .
(viii} Also forbidden to marry were uncle and niece, and
great uncle and great niece.

However, the Emperor Claudius

stated that marriage with a brother's daughter was lawful,
since he wished to marry Agrippina, his niece.

Three and

a half centuries later the old rule was restored.
Fratris filiam uxorem ducere licet,
idque primum in usum venit cum
divus Claudius Agrippinam fratris
sui filiam uxorem duxisset, sororis
vero f iliam ducere non licet et
haec ita principibus constitutionibus
significantur.18
(ix) Augustus' Lex Papia forbade those of senatorial order
from marrying actresses, but the Emperor Justin allowed
this type of marriage, thus permitting his nephew Justinian
to marry Theodora.

In 542 A.D. Justinian abolished for

all senators these restrictions relating to the m~rriage

7

agreements. 1 9

Justinian, however, because of religious

scruples, forbade marriage between the baptized and his or
her sponsor.
If both parties were Roman citizens and not restricted from marrying for any reason, then the marriage was
iustae nuptiae

and the children of that marriage were iusti

liberi and cives optima iure (possessing all civil rights).
If one party was a Roman citizen and the other was a member of a corrununity having ius conubii but not full civitas
the marriage was still iustae nuptiae,but the children of
that marriage took the civil standing of the father.

If

either party were without ius conubii the marriage was legal
but nuptiae iniustae and the children, though legitimate,
20
received the rank of the lower degree.
Matrimonii Modi
In Roman times there were two types of marriage:
(i) cum manu and (ii) sine manu.

The earlier and original

form of marriage, cum manu, was that in which the woman
passed into the manus of her husband.

(amU.y

8lh1

adopted.

becmm·"!

She left her agnatic

G membr·r \'t' his family as if she were

Whatever property she took with her became part

of the property of her husband or his paterfamilias. Her
husband had control over her and she stood in loco f iliae
to him.21

Marriage sine manu appears to date back as far

as the XII Tables, but cum manu was the common ~orm of

8

marriage.

By the end of the Republic sine manu, however,

was the common form and cum manu the exception.

In a sine

manu marriage the woman did not come under the power of
her husband nor did she even become a member of his agnatic
family; she remained under the postestas of her father if
alive and if not she was sui iuris and a tutor was appointed as though she were single.

According to civil law, she

was not related to her children; they were under the
potestas of her husband.
no ceremony.

A marriage of this type required

All that was necessary was the consent of the

parties and, if they were in potestate, of the patres, together with a de facto beginning of a conjugal agreement.

·
·
h a d to b e ev1·a ent. 22
T h e intent
o f t h e parties
Cum Manu Matrimonia
There were three different methods for establishing a marriage cum manu.

These methods were established

first by the XII Tables.
Conf arreatio
Conf arreatio was a religious ceremony requiring

t \\8

prPRPlh'~ t~f <\

lr1<\,\ \ \hl pr h'ttt.

This type of marriage

was limited to the aristocratic patrician class, though
not necessarily legally.

According to Gaius, the name

comes from the use of spelt bread (pannis farreus) in the
sacrifice made to Jupiter Farreus.

9

Farreo in manum convenient per
quoddam genus sacrif icii quod
Iovi Farreo fit; in quo farreus
panis adhibetur unde etiam
confarreatio dicitur.23
The Pontifex Maximus and Flamen Dialis

had to be

present at the ceremony along with ten witnesses.

This

form of marriage was requisite for the four highest state
priesthoods - Rex Sacrorum, Flamen Dialis, Flamen Martialis,
and Flamen Quirinalis.

Not only did the holders of these

offices have to be married by confarreatio,but their parents also had to have been married by this same procedure. 24
. nam flamines maiores, id
est Diales, Martiales, Quirinales,
item reges sacrorum, nisi ex farreatis
nati non leguntur; ac ne ipsi quidem
sine confarreatione sacerdotium
habere possunt.25
Coemptio
Coemptio was a fictitious sale of the wife to the
husband, and in early times may have actually been a sale.
The purchase was a certain application of mancipatio, a
mode of transferring certain types of valuable property.
Coemptione vero in manum convenient
per mancipationem,id est per quandam imaginariam venditionem. Nam,
adhibitis non minus quam V testibus
civibus Romanis puberibus, item
libripende, emit is mulierem civis
in manum convenit.26
There are two views of the original nature of
coemptio.

(i) It never was a real purchase, but came

into existence after mancipation had become a "fictitious

10

sale."

It was introduced by the plebians so they could

acquire rights over their wives in the manner that the
confarreatio granted these rights to patricians.

Before

this, plebian marriages had not been recognized according
to civil law.

Therefore, the plebians wanted recognition,

and also desired to counter the patrician claim that persons born of unrecognized unions were not fit for state
offices.

Therefore,"in support of this view it is urged

that coemptio is too purely secular an institution to belong to the earliest stratum of Roman law. 1127
(ii) It was "the Roman form of the widely spread
institution of marriage by purchase, and

~hatj

originally

some real consideration was given to her father or guardian in exchange for the bride, or

., for the power

(manus) over her. 28
The latter view seems to be the most acceptable,
for marriage by purchase was so common among other nations
that it seems the same was probable in Rome.

Also in ref-

erence to the first theory it does not seem likely that
in a legally conservative nation there would be a deliberate introduction of a new form of marriage for merely
. .
. .
po 1 it1cal
purposes, ra th er th,an re 1 ig1ous
purposes. 2 9

In

the coemptio ceremony at least five persons had to be present as witnesses and a sixth as libripens or balance holder.

The precise words and forms used for the ceremony

are unknown, but most likely they were similar to those

11

used in the mancipatio ceremony.30
Us us
Usus was the acquisition of a wife by possession.
Usus was related to coemptio in the same manner as usucapio
to mancipatio.

A Roman citizen who bought some property

and got possession but not ownership because he failed to
follow certain forms outlined by jus civile might become
owner through the process of usucapio, i.e. through a lapse
of time.

If the object were in his continuous possession

for one year he might then become owner. 31
There are two theories relating to the institution
of usus:

(i) Usus originally was not a separate form of

marriage, but arose from the principle that any defect in
the other forms of marriage would be cured by the de facto
relationship of man and wife for one year.

Confarreatio

and coemptio were both complicated ceremonies, and any slip
concerning the correct procedure would make the marriage
invalid, but if the parties lived together for one year
the defect would become void and manus would then occur.
Often it was difficult to distinguish between a defective
ceremony and no ceremony at all.

Therefore, it became

accepted that if two people lived together with the
intention of being married

they would, without participat-

ing in any ceremony, be married cum manu at the end of one
year.

32

There was, however, a devise which would cancel

12

the manus relationship but not the marriage.

This privi-

lege of defeating manus was granted by the XII Tables.

It

was at first probably a device of patricians to protect
their interests, for occasionally patrician women married
plebians.

If the wife remained apart from her husband for

three consecutive nights during the year she failed to enter the manus.

By this contrivance a woman could prevent

becoming plebian herself, and if she had any property she
could keep it out of the husband's control.
at her death

Therefore,

her property went to her patrician agnates. 33

This informal type of marriage was known as matrimonium
jure gentium and was possible even for aliens.

However,

the wife was known only as uxor and not materfamilias,and
the children followed the mother; they did not pass under
the potestas of the father. 3 4
(ii) Another view relating to usus was that it was
originally a separate method of contracting marriage - a
type of marriage on approval.

It was

comparable to the 'handfast' marriages found at one time in the
north of England and in Scotland,
which became permanent if the woman bore a child or became pregnant within a year and a day, but
might be dissolved if she did not. 35
Usus might also be connected to marriage by capture the idea being that if the union lasted for one year the
father lost his right of power over his daughter.
ficulty in this theory for the modern mind is

b~ing

The difable

13

to distinguish between marriage and concubinage.

This was

not a problem for the Romans who regarded marriage as a
de facto

relationship distinguishable from concubinage by

attendant events such as betrothal and the festivities
which customarily attended the marriage.

The intention of

the parties to marry had to be manifest. 36
Conf arreatio continued to be the prevailing type
of marriage until the time of Cicero.

At the time of

Gaius marriage was generally secured by coemptio,and at the
time of Justinian only the freer type existed.

Confarreatio

only survived for specific purposes however (religious priesthood).

Actually by the time of Gaius manus was virtually

obsolete.

By a gradual development which was probably com-

plete by the time of Cicero, the informal marriage had come
to be the formal marriage and thus recognized as justum
matrirnonium; although the wife did not come under the husband's power, the children of the marriage did.37
Effectus Civilis Matrimonii
Once a civil marriage had been established several
effects were produced:

(i) The children were liberi

iusti and in potestas of the paterfamilias and were agnates
of his agnates.

(ii) Apart from manus the wife did not en-

ter her husband's familia and therefore was not concerned
with his religion.

(iii) The wife did not necessarily take

the husband's name though during the Empire she often did.
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(iv) The wife shared the husband's honorific titles.
properties remained distinct.
void.

(v) Their

(vi) Gifts between them were

Apart from issue, the effects of marriage legally

were the result of the Roman conception of liberum matrimonium.
Whether the parties were married or not was important if
there were issue and for that reason there were certain
rules for a valid marriage.

Relief against error of status

was given only if there were issue.

If there were no issue

no relief was necessary; the parties could end their relation at any time.38
Dos
In addition to the civil effects of a marriage,
another important concern was that of dos.

Dos or dowry

was the "transfer (or promise to transfer) of things having
a money value from the bride's side - her family or friends
- to the husband."39

The husband became full owner of the

property, and the dos was intended to help defray some of
the expenses which were a part of marriage.
trival.

Dowry was not

There was no set rule that it had to be the

intestate portion, i.e. what she could expect from her
father's estate in any event; but that this was at least
the socially expected magnitude is suggested by the rules
of collatio datis, whereby a woman claiming a share of
paternal inheritance might have to bring her dowry into
account.40
In a marriage cum manu the property of-a woman sui
iuris passed to her husband. If the daughter were under
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the power of her father it was customary for the father to
provide a dowry for the husband.

This dowry could also be

supplied by other interested persons, other than the
father.

If the marriage were sine manu the woman could own

property and even have property given to her, but it was
still customary for the dowry to be given to the husband.
Generally there was much negotiation about dowry arrangements prior to marriage - pacta dotolia.

The arrangement

could be of almost any type.
There were three kinds of dos:

(i) dos profecticia -

provided by the father or other paternal ancestor whose
legal duty it was to provide the dowry for the woman,
dos adventicia - dowry corning from any other source,

(ii)
(iii)

dos recepticia - a type of dos adventicia but given on the
agreement that it be returned to the donor on the wife's
death.

The dos might be constituted in three ways:

(i)

aut datur - handed over at the time the agreement was made,
(ii) aut dicitur - ancient verbal contract in which the
bride, paternal ascendant, or debtor might agree informally
to give it.

This type became obsolete.

(iii) aut

promittitur - this was the ordinary course followed in
which the dos was not actually handed over at the time of
the agreement.

The person agreeing to give the dos bound

himself to do so by a solemn stipulation.

From the time

of Theodosius and Valentinian, a mere promise to give the
dowry became actionable as a pactum legitimum.41

At the

termination of a marriage various things could happen to
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the dos.

If the dos were recepticia, i.e. if the donor

prior to marriage made the husband agree to restore the
dos, then the donor or heir could compel restoration.

If

no such stipulation had been made the husband according to a
strict view of civil law was entitled to keep the entire
dos for himself.

The wife, though, had a moral claim for

the return, and often or usually it was recognized.
About 200 B.C. a new action, actio rei uxoriae
appeared.

This differed from an actio ex stipulatu because

it allowed for the recovery of dos at the end of marriage
even though no agreement had been made for its return.
The actio rei uxoriae was a bonae f idei situation as
opposed to the stricti juris interpretation of actio ex
stipulatu.

Therefore, the judge was not bound unconditionally

to order the return of the dos,but had the discretion to
enforce such equities as he thought best.

The judge might

make allowances to the husband for expenses pertaining to
property, or if the termination of marriage were due to the
wife's adultery or other fault, the judge could make a
reduction from the amount to be returned, the amount
depending on the seriousness of the offense.

On the other

hand, if the termination was due to the fault of the
husband, the wife might then recover more than the
original sum of the dos.

Unlike actio ex stipulatu,

actio rei uxoriae did not pass to the heir.

If the wife

predeceased the husband, the husband was allowed to keep
all the dos except dos profecticia.

Justinian changed
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this law so that the dowry had to be returned in every case
except for misconduct of the wife.

The husband could claim

rebate only concerning outlay upon dotal property necessary
for its preservation.

The husband was also forced to make

compensation for any movable property which he had alienated
or for damages to the dotal property due to his negligence;
and as a further protection Justinian gave the wife tacita
hypotheca (implied mortgage) over her husband's estate.42
Gifts originally were not allowed between husband
and wife, but under Christian emperors a donatio ante nuptias
(later propter nuptias) was allowed.

This was a gift to the

bride from the groom or his family, often matching in value
the dos.

This was set aside for the wife's future use if

she should survive her husband.

Though set aside, the

husband meanwhile could use and enjoy it.

If the wife died

before him or if divorce occurred without fault on his part
it was extinguished.

If the wife survived the husband and

there was issue she then had life use of the donatio for
herself and her children.

But if there were no issue then

it passed to his heirs, unless specific arrangements had
been made to the contrary.

If marriage were terminated by

divorce because of the husband's fault, he was penalized by
losing the donatio and it passed to the wife. 4 3
Other property which the wife owned that was not
part of the dos or donatio was known as parapherna.

The

husband had no right over the wife's bona paraphernalia
except what she granted him.

18
Potestas Problema
A paterfamilias could not order his married children
to

divorc~

but they could not marry without his consent.

Whether he could order them to marry a particular person
is a complex question.

The Digest 23.2.21 states that he

could not do so concerning his

son~

and the same is implied

in Gellius (Noctes Atticae II, 7, 20) concerning the son's
moral duty.

" . . . he ought to obey; but if his father orders

him to take a shameful or criminal wife . .

• he should not

obey, for if turpitude enters into the question these things
are no longer indifferent."

The father, however, could make the

situation more difficult concerning the daughters.

The

Digest 23.1.11-12 says, "that a daughter's consent is
necessary for bethrothal, but adds that anything short of
positive resistance is taken for consent, and consent can
only be refused if the proposed bridegroom is morally unfit."
The control of the paterfamilias did not apply in the sphere
of public affairs, but privately one was in the control of
the paterfamilias; if one were in potestate he owned nothing.
Whatever was acquired accrued to the paterfamilias.

One

could make no gifts and if one borrowed, the debt was owed
to the paterfamilias.
produced many problems.

Loans of money to sons in potestate
Therefore, during the reign of

Vespasian a decree made it impossible for a lender to sue
the paterfamilias for payment on such loans.
it was very unlikely that loans were made to
potestate.

As a result
thos~

in

How then was a filius familias with a wife and
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a separate home able to run his own household if he owned
nothing?

There are two possible answers neither supported

by much evidence:

(i) emancipatio took a son out of

potestate but generally this was used only for misbehavior,
(ii) there existed the institution of peculium - "a son in
potestate like a slave could have a fund which, though
ultimately belonging to the head of the family, was in
practice his to manage, and on the basis of which he could
contract. 11 44

This situation was most probable for sons

living independently, but in potestate; but the situation
certainly had its

limitation~

for the peculium actually

belonged to the paterfamilias and could be terminated by the
paterfamilias at any time and was part of the estate of the
paterfamilias when he died. Augustus' legislation invented
an extra peculium, the Eeculium castrense (military fund)

-

what a son acquired by or for the purpose of military service was his own.

He could will it however he pleased, but

if he did not it reverted to the paterfamilias as part of
the peculium.

The son could alienate the peculium castrense

at any time, and the father was unable to touch it. 45
Augustus may have introduced this program to encourage
volunteer enlistment in his army.
In the time of the early Republic the foundation
of Roman social life was monogamous and marriage was dominated by the husband, but it would be wrong to assume that
sexual relationships were confined to marriage; free sexual
intercourse co-existed with marriage.
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According to Bachofen, The Right of the Mother,
there are three stages of marriage:

(i) primitive stage -

indiscriminate sexual intercourse,

(ii) intermediate stage -

marriage dominated by the wife and (iii) highest

~tage

-

marriage dominated by the husband.
. . . This is the highest type
of law and it was most purely
developed by Rome. Nowhere else
did the ideal of potestas (power)
over wife and child reach such
complete maturity; and so nowhere
else was the corresponding ideal
of a unified political imperium
(supreme power) so consciously
and consistently pursued." "The
Romans banished from their laws
the physical and materialistic
view of human relationships, more
completely than any other nations;
for Rome was from the first
founded on the political aspect of
the imperium; in conscious adherence
to this as~ect Rome pursued her
destiny. 4
A sort of matriarchy may have prevailed for many
centuries before there was the real development of the Roman
family based on patria potestas.
remained in the

'~ree

Remnants of this matriarchy

sexual intercourse which co-existed

with the monogamous marriage recognized by the state. 11 47
Much of this paper has been devoted to the
institution of marriage, its development, its forms and the
laws concerning it.

However something must be said concerning

the actual ceremony itself and the many customs and festivities surrounding it.
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Nuptiales Ritus
A Roman wedding was only allowed to occur on certain
days.

Forbidden days were the entire month of May because

of the Argean and Lemuria offerings and the first half of
June because of the religious days connected with Vesta.
Also forbidden were the first half of March as well as the
Kalends, Nones, and Ides of each month and each day following
them.

Also avoided were the dies parentales (February 13-21)

and the days when the entrance to the lower world was open,
August 24, October 5, and November 8.

Numerous Roman

festivals were also avoided on religious grounds and also
great holidays because people usually had other engagements.
Women marrying for the second time often chose these holidays
in order to make their wedding less noticeable.48
The actual marriage rites began the day before the
wedding.

The young bride laid aside the dress she had worn

as a girl and dedicated it to the gods along with her childhood playthings.

Then she put on her bridal attire, the

tunica recta or regilla.

This was a white tunic, woven in

one piece and falling to the floor.

Fastened about the

marriage tunic was a band tied in a manner called the knot
of Hercules, probably because Hercules was the guardian of
marriage and the patron of good fortune.

Only the husband

was allowed to untie the knot of Hercules.49

Over the

tunica, the bride wore a cloak or palla of saffron color and
around her neck she wore a metal collar.

Covering her head

the bride wore a large veil called the f lammeum.

This
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veil draped over her head but did not cover her face.

The

veil was flame colored - a yellow - reddish hue, the color
sacred to the god of marriage, Hymen.
color were the shoes she wore.
to the arrangement of her hair.

Matching the veil in

Special emphasis was paid
It was the custom for the

groom to part the bride's hair into six plaits.
done with the bent point of an iron spearhead.

This was
A spearhead

which had recently killed a gladiator was considered
especially effective, since the parting of the hair may have
been done to dispel the evil spirits which reside particularly in the hair.SO
fillets

The six locks were fastened with wooden

(vittae) at the top of her head in the shape of

a cone (meta) called a tutulus.

This was a primitive

coiffure which except for some priestesses was used only
for brides on their wedding day.

Under her veil the bride

wore a crown of flowers which she had gathered herself.
The groom also wore a wreath of flowers on his head. 5 1
Others at the ceremony also wore wreaths of flowers.

The

bride's house, if the ceremony occurred there, was
decorated with flowers, tree boughs, bands of wool, and
tapestries.
Cicero says (De Div. i. 16, 28) that the marriage
began by the taking of the auspices early in the morning of
the ceremony day.

Quondam rnaioris rei nisi auspicato ne

privatim quidem gerebatur, quod etiam nunc nuptiarum
auspices declarant, qui, re omissa, nomen tantum tenent.
Meanwhile the guests were assembling and were
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informed of the auspices.

The marriage contract was then

completed in the presence of ten witnesses.

Then the bride

and groom solemnly declared that they agreed on the marriage.
They were next led to each other and their hands were brought
together by a pronuba (usually a married woman representing
Juno).

The couple then moved to the altar to offer the

chief sacrifice,

(ancient times - fruit or far, and in later

times - pig or bullock) .
with sheepskin.

They sat on two seats tied together

The auspex nuptiarum or the attendant priest

of this confarreatio ceremony recited words of prayer for
the couple to repeat while walking around the altar.

Then

good wishes were extended to the couple and the banquet
began.

The wedding feast was generally at the home of the

bride's father, rarely at the groom's home.

The feast

ended with the distribution of the wedding cake, mustaceum.
These feasts became so extravagant that during the reign of
Augustus it was suggested that a limit of 1,000 sesterces
b~ set, but this never became law.52

At night the last

stage of the ceremony began - the deductio, procession,
escorting the bride to her husband's house.

Ancient custom

dictated that the bride be torn by her husband from her
mother.

Festus (288) said, "They pretend that the girl is

torn away from the protection of her mother, or if her mother
is not present, from the protection of her next-of-kin, when
she is dragged to her husband. 115 3

This custom may point to

the primitive marriage by capture and may also be a reference
to the rape of the Sabine women.

The bride was ·then escorted

in a procession to the husband's house.
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Three young people whose fathers were still living
simulated a rape and carried the bride to the husband's house.
The bridal couple in a carriage was preceded by flute players
and a boy with a torch, which had been lit at the hearth of
the bride's father.

Surrounding and following them were the

guests and the public.

Phallic songs were sung and there

may have been a phallic dance.

Such a procession is referred

to in Catullus' famous marriage song, #61, an invocation to
Hymen.

Everyone in the procession was shouting "Talasio"

and had no idea of what it meant.

The procession to the

groom's house occurred even when the groom was absent and
therefore played his part by letter or messenger.54
bride carried three coins with her.

The

During the procession

she dropped one as an offering to the Lares Compitales, gave
one to the groom as a symbol of the dowry and gave the last
to the Lares of her husband's house.SS

When the procession

reached the husband's house the boy carrying the torch threw
it away, and a mad scramble for it ensued, for its possession
promised a long life.

If either the husband or wife had

been trapped into marrying and wished to ensure the other's
quick death, the bride, if she caught it, should extinguish
it and place it under the marriage bed; and the groom, if
he caught it, left it on a tomb and allowed it to burn
itself out. 56

The wife then annointed the doorposts with

oil and bound them with woolen threads.

Then she was lifted

over the threshold and received fire and water and together
the bride and groom lit the new hearth.

She was· afterwards
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sprinkled with water and therefore admitted to share the
domestic and religious life of her husband.

In the hall

of the groom's house was found a small be.d for the groom's
genius and the bride's juno.
Consummation also followed certain customs.

The

pronuba had prepared the marriage bed and instructed the
bride.

The bride prayed to Juno Virginensis and to Circia

(goddess to whom the loosening of the girdle was consecrated) •
The husband loosened his wife's girdle, but only women who
had been married once could undress the bride on her wedding
night.57

The bride then sat down (probably naked) on the

phallus of the god of fertility, Mutunus Tutunus.58

In most

ancient times the first intercourse was probably in the
presence of witnesses.

Also friends of the husband may have

had intercourse with the bride.

Bachofen says,

Natural and physical laws are
alien and even opposed to the
marriage tie. Accordingly the
woman who is entering marriage
must atone to mother nature for
violating her and go through a
period of free prostitution, in
which she purchases the chastity
of marriage by preliminary
unchastity.59
The sexual intercourse was superintended by a series of
deities whose names represent various stages of the act.
In later times husband's friends threw nuts into the bridal
chamber.60

The day after the wedding, a second wedding feast

occurred, the repotia.

Friends and relatives attended this

and here the bride made her first offering as matrona.
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One should not suppose, however, that the entire
complicated ceremony was always observed even in first
marriages, especially since, as has been stated earlier,
no ceremony was required for marriage.
Roman marriage was an institution much influenced
by tradition and symbolism as evident in the actual ceremony.

Tradition and custom would probably have allowed

parents to arrange a child's marriage.

It was customary

that marriages were arranged for the good of the state, but
it seems incredible that the child did not rebel against
this action.

Roman youth were obviously taught that the

state came first.
The consent of the paterfamilias.was a complex
issue.

Legally it may not have been requisite, but

customarily it had to be given especially for a young man
if he were in potestate.

He was dependent on his

paterfamilias for a livelihood.

He could never be financially

independent, for anything which he might accrue had to
revert to the father.

In this situation the power of the

purse was mighty!
The institution of marriage changed greatly from
the time of the XII Tables to the time of Justinian.
Originally the husband had marital power over the wife;
she fell under his potestas or under that of his
paterfamilias; and all of her property, if she had any, came
with her.

Gradually during the late Republic and early

Empire the idea appeared that the wife ought not to have
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to change her status - that she should remain as she was
prior to marriage, and that she should be as free and
independent as her husband.

This free type of marriage was

very much in vogue at the time of Gaius and Justinian.
The husband no longer had tyra'nnical control over his wife.
They each retained their own identity - even to the extent
of keeping their properties separate.
distinct individuals!

They were two

The wife no longer legally became a

member of her husband's family.

CHAPTER II
DIVORTIUM
The marriage agreement under Roman law was considered
a contract and was "consistently logical in recognizing that
marriage like any other contract might be broken or dissolved. 116
Roman law held that a contract not to divorce was invalid,
because it infringed on the right of married couples to divorce if they ever so desired. 62

Divorce law changed greatly

as Rome grew from a small city to an empire.
It has been asserted that for the first 500 years of
Rome's existence there was no divorce until approximately
230 B.

c.

when Spurius Carvilius divorced his barren wife.

That divorce did not take place until this late date is unlikel~

for the XII Tables of 451 B. C. recognized freedom of

divorce under the formula Res tuas tibi habeto and the wife's
63
surrender of the household keys.
Therefore, Carvilius'
divorce may have occurred in the seventh or sixth century B.
At the time of the kings a husband could divorce his
wife for adultery, tampering with the keys, or poisoning a

child. 65

Under the ancient marriage laws, a wife in manu

(no independent status) could not divorce her husband, but
if he divorced her she could obtain release from the marital
control of manus.

66
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Divortii Actiones
There were two distinct types of divorce actions:
(i)

repudium - divorce by the will of either husband or

wife and (ii)

divortium - divorce by mutual consent.

Ori-

ginally repudium was granted only to the husband, but later
was extended to the wife, and divortium was not possible
for a manus marriage. 67

The Christian clergy unsuccessfully

tried to do away with divortium, but it continued until
Justinian.

A marriage of manus, performed by a ceremony of

confarreatio, was dissolved by a diffareatio ceremony (religious ceremonies corresponding to marriage ceremonies).
Divorce was not possible for the Flamines Diales, married
by confarreatio.

There is only one instance of a divorce of

a Flamen Dialis,and that was granted by special permission
of Domitian. 68
Gaius indicates that after Tiberius changed the
confarreatio procedure, a wife could divorce or be divorced
through the repudium procedure.
emptio or usus

In other marriages of co-

marriage was dissolved by a remancipatio

ceremony - for the most part the same procedure used for
the emancipation of a daughter.
In manu autem esse mulieres desinunt
1sdem modis quibus f iliae familias potestate
patris 11berantur. Sicut igitur filiae
familias una mancipatione de potestate
patris exeunt, ita eae quae in manu
sunt una mancipatione desinunt in manu
esse, et si ex ea mancipatione manumissae fuerint, sui iuris efficiuntur.69
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Inter earn uero quae cum extraneo et
earn quae cum uiro suo coernptionern
fecerit, hoc interest, quod illa quidern
cogere coernptionatorern potest u~ se
rernancipet cui ipsa uelit, haec autern
uirurn suurn nihilo rnagis potest cogere I
quarn et f ilia patrern. Sed f ilia quidern
nullo rnodo patrern potest cogere, etiarnsi
adoptiua sit; haec autern Tuirurn] repudio
rnisso proinde cornpellere ~otest atque si
ei nurnquarn nupta fuisset. 0
Where marriage was sinu rnanu divorce was free to
either party.

Just as marriage began by a de facto beginning

as husband and wife so it also ended if this life were broken by a desire to divorce by either party.

But mere sep-

aration did not constitute a divorce; the intention of
divorce had to be made manifest to the spouse.

The husband

could send the wife away using the traditional formula* or
the wife could leave declaring her wishes for the marriage
to end.

No particular form was used, but generally there was

a written or oral message, and repudiurn or nuntiurn mittere
became conunon expressions of divorce.71
In the Republic and in earlier classical law the
paterfamilias had the power to end by divorce a marriage
of his child, without his child's consent.

Reference is

made in The New Testament to possibly this type of divorce where
Paul writes that Pius forbade separation of a bene concordans
matrirnonum by the father.

However, this may mean that though

the divorce were valid, the father could not compel actual
separation.72

Marcus Aurelius abolished this paternal

priviledge of divorcing a daughter without her permission;
but, nevertheless, in the Justinian Code there is one instance

* cf.

p. 28
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remaining when divorce was not granted unless with parental
permission - when the mother or father paid the dowry and
would suffer harm at its forfeiture. 73
There were no divorce courts during the Republic, and
though a wife might repudiate her spouse she could take no
legal action against him, even if he were guilty of adultery.
If a wife were unfaithful her husband simply divorced her
and retained part of the dowry, or if the marriage were manu
then a family tribunal, including her relatives, was summoned and she might be sentenced to death. 74
By the end of the Republic divorce was common place,
especially in Rome.

It was alleged that women reckoned the

years by husbands and not by consuls.

Juvenal speaks of

ladies "having eight husbands in five years. 1175 Most likely
this was an exaggeration, but,
truth.

nevertheles~

based on some

A husband might even divorce his wife in her absence.

Cicero ended his marriage to Terentia by letter.76
Divortii Leges
Augustus
Augustus through legislation tried to change the
trend of frequent divorces.

His statute Lex Julia de Adult-

eriis of 18 B. C. restricted the form of divorce.

Under

this legislation a written bill of divorcement (libellus
repudii)

ought to be delivered to the other party but was

not compelled.

The divorce had to take place before seven

adult male citizens, and their seals were required if the
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intent of divorce were in writing.

Later, this became the

only acceptable form of divorce.77
Under the statute of Lex Julia adultery was made a
public crime.

Permanent courts were set up to hear cases

against married women and their paramours.

A married man

was liable as a paramour if he seduced another's wife and
if she were prosecuted by her husband.

He was also liable

for prosecution if he practiced stuprum - an offense if his
mistress were not a registered prostitute.

Women of respect-

able origins were not permitted by the Senate to register as
prostitutes. 78

Augustus' purposes in reforming divorce law

were
. . . to devise some satisfactory
form of proof that divorce had in
effect taken place; to make adultery
and other gross immorality (stuprum)
crimes actionable before a special
court, and to prevent connivance in
a wife's adultery or a husband's
part by encouraging the public informer who, at Rome, doubled the
part of public prosecutor.79
Augustus' new laws established new duties for husbands.

If he discovered his wife in an adulterous act he

must divorce her, or if he were dependent on his father, his
father on his behalf prosecuted the divorce.

Failure to

do this could have resulted in the husband being prosecuted
for condoning adulterous behavior, and if he were condemned
he would be punished as an adulterer.

He was allowed sixty

days after the divorce to bring action against the guilty
wife and lover.

If the husband wished to forgive hi·s wife
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or if he felt that divorce were adequate punishment, the
common informer was present to prevent this.

The informer,

who often profited by Augustus' laws, had four months in
which to prosecute.

The time limitation did not commence

until sixty days from the granting of the divorce had passed.
If the informer waited six months after divorce or five
years after the alleged offense he could no longer prosecute.so
Augustus' legislation saw an end to the husband's
right to kill the wife if discovered in adultery, though
if the lover were found in his house the husband could kill
the lover if he were an inferior person, such as a slave
or family freedman.

However, the wife could be killed by

her father if he caught her in the act and if he killed
or tried to kill the adulterer at the same time.Bl

Augustus'

laws also ended family tribunals except when the Senate
felt that the offense should be investigated privately in
lieu of public court.

Augustus' legislation seems to have

had one immense weakness.

It

did not provide any means

for a wife to directly prosecute her husband for adultery.
If a husband were questioned for adultery it was not through
the insistance of his wife but rather his lover's husband.
Constantine
During Constantine's reign the laws concerning adultery became even more strict than those of Augustus.

Much

of the legislation can be attributed to the influence of the
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Christian religion and its strict moral codes.

It was not

until Constantine that adultery was made actionable in the
case of the husband as well as the wife.

For centuries

Stoicism had deplored the double standard privileges for husbands, and the Jewish and Christain religion had imposed by
its religious code a
. d . 82
1 aw require

higher standard of morality than the

.
P 1 utarch said,
"a husband who bars his wife

from the pleasures in which he himself indulges is like a
man who surrenders to the enemy and tells his wife to go on
. h .
f ig
ting. 83

During Constantine's reign if a wife were found guilty of adultery, she and her lover were banished to different islands; the wife lost one-half of her dowry, one-third
of her property, and it was a criminal offense for anyone to
remarry her.
property.

Her lover was also deprived of one-half of his

After Constatine both guilty parties were con-

dernned to death.
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Constantine enacted that if divorce occur-

red outside of acceptable grounds, a wife might be penalized
concerning her dos and she might even be deported, and a
husband lost his right to ever remarry.

If he did remarry,

the divorced wife might seize the second wife's dos.

Ninety

years later this extreme penalty was restricted to cases
where where there were no grounds for divorce, and if the
grounds were insufficient the wife might not remarry and the
husband not for two years.

85
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Justinian
These laws did not appear under Justinian but there
were similar provisions.

He set up other legitimate grounds

for divorce and if divorce were not due to a recognized
ground, the wife was to be confined to a nunnery for the
remainder of her life, and she had to forfeit her property
to various uses, including the nunnery.
86
. t on 1 y t o pecuniary
.
.
JeC
pena lt ies.

The husband was sub-

.
I f remarriage
occurred

by either party after divorce, there was legislation aimed
at preserving for the children of the first marriage the dos
and donatio connected with that marriage.

In the Republic,

penalties were much less severe and a causeless divorce
might have involved only a nota censoria and a loss of dos. 87
Under Justinian a man could be fined in the wife's
favor.

If he brought divorce without sufficient reasons, he

could be fined one-third of all the property she acquired at
her marriage.
Code.

Sufficient grounds are found in the Justinian

These grounds, from a constitution of Theodosius and

Valens, included "strong suspicion on either side of the
other party having engaged in adulterous, criminal, or treasonable practices, or keeping the company of flagitious
characters, or using or threatening personal violence, especially of a kind outrageous to the freeborn citizen."88
Dos
The dowry was a deciding factor in many divorces.
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Dowry (dos) is a gift to the husband from the bride to help
defray the husband's expenses pertaining to married life.
For a manus marriage, a woman's property passed to her husband,
and if she were under the control of her father, the father
would provide the dowry.

If the marriage were sine manu she

could own property, but nevertheless a dowry was usually
given to her husband.

If the dowry were given by the bride

or someone for her, it was called dos adventicia.
ally, neither in a

~marriage

Origin-

nor sine manu did the hus-

band appear to have any legal duty to return the dowry if
the marriage were terminated by divorce. 89
At the time of the XII Tables neither a wife nor her
father had any right to claim any portion of the dowry, if
the wife were guilty of any one of the three acceptable
90
.
groun d s o f d 1vorce.

If she were expelled from the home

for any other reasons, the husband was required to give his
wife one-half of his property.

This was the situation in

the case of Spurius Carvilius.

According to Aulus Gellius,

Servius Sulpicius in this book on Dowries said
Servius quoque Sulpicius in libro,
quern composuit De Dotibus, tum
primum cautiones rei uxoriae
necessarias esse visas scripsit,
cum Spurius Carviliu~ cui Ruga
cognomentum fuit, vir n~bilis~
divortium cum uxore fecit, quia
liberi ex ea corporis vitio non
gignerentur . · .91
Technically Spurius Carvilius should have given onehalf of his property to his divorced wife, for she had committed
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none of the offenses that were legal grounds for divorce.
The probability is that the penalty was not exacted as was
the custom.

No legal action could be taken against him to

require him to return the dowry.
very significant to the Romans.

This particular case was
After this it was wise for

the bride's father or guardian to make personal financial
arrangements in case the marriage failed.
Many divorces were restrained because of financial
considerations.

Marcus Aurelius at the suggestion that he

divorce Faustina replied, "What - and return the dowry?"
meaning the empire, for he had succeeded his father-in-law,
the former emperor.
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When Cicero divorced Terentia he had a very difficult
time coming up with the necessary money to return the full
amount of the dowry.

It is most probable that when he died,

four years after his divorce, the dowry still remained unpa1"d • 93
An interesting case involving dowry rights is that of

C. Titinius of Minturnae who applied to Judge C. Marius to
receive the dowry of his divorced wife on the grounds of
immoral character.

The judge knew that Titinius had known

of her character prior to marriage and married her with future divorce and dowry in mind.

Therefore, the judge imposed

a small fine on her and forced Titinius to pay a sum equal
to the amount of her dowry.

She later repaid Marius by hid94
ing him in her home when he was fleeing from Sulla.
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Often a divorced wife or her father or tutor in her
behalf had to go to court to recover the dowry.

In the early

Republic, a judge had complete discretion over the matter,
but by the end of the Republic there were fixed rules.

If

a wife or her father sought divorce a husband could get
one-sixth for each child up to three children.

If the wife

were guilty of adultery, he might retain an extra

one-six~h.

If she were guilty of a less serious offense he might retain
. h t h . 95
an extra one-eig

If a husband did not return the dowry a woman of
marriageable age would have a difficult time remarrying.
Therefore,many changes occurred in the laws concerning dowry
rights as the divorce rate increased.
In many cases the giver of the dowry could stipulate
prior to marriage that the dowry be returned in the event
of divorce (actio ex stipulatu) .

If the dowry was not re-

turned a special action (actio rei uxoriae), which appeared
approximately in 200 B. C., was allowed to the wife for the
return of the dowry or part of it when the marriage was dissolved by divorce.

"The action was almost certainly in bonum

et aequum concepta. 1196
of bonae fidei.

The actio rei uxoriae was an action

The judge was not legally bound to return

the dos but had discretion to decide as he thought best.
He could make allowances for the husband, for the expenses
on property and for marriage termination due to the adultery
of the wife.
occur.

Generally a reduction in dowry return would

If the husband's misconduct was the reason for divorce,
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. ht b e awar d e d a sum 1 arger t h an th e origina
. . 1 d os. 97
th e wi'fe mig
Justinian greatly changed the laws regarding dowry.
He said that a husband had to restore the dowry in every case
except misconduct of the wife.

The husband could only. claim

rebate for outlay expenses concerning preservation of dotal
property but was forced to make amends for any movable property which he had alienated or for damage to the dos through
his negligence.

Justinian also added tacita hypotheca (im-

plied mortgage) over the husband's whole estate. 98
Donatio
Similar to dos was donatio propter nuptias, a gift
given by the husband.

Originally

it was given only before

marriage since Roman law did not allow gifts

between hus-

band and wife, but Justin I allowed that the gift might be
increased after marriage.

Justinian added that donatio

might then be constituted after marriage, and the former name
ante nuptias was therefore changed to propter nuptias.

Even-

tually the husband's relatives were obligated to provide a
donatio, just as the bride's relatives provided the dos for
the husband.
dos.

The donatio had to equal in monetary value the

The control or management of the donatio and the dos

was given to the husband, but under Justinian the husband
could not alienate the immovable part of donatio even with
the consent of his wife, and the wife had tacita hypotheca
to secure the donatio.

At the dissolution of the marriage

by divorce because of the husband's misconduct, the wife had
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a life estate in the property, sharing the dominum with
issue. 99
Alimony was unknown in the present sense to Roman
law.

Alimony, however, is of Roman origin, but only as a

claim of support by a ward against an unfaithful guardian.
A praetor would fix the amount necessary for support (alimenta) .
Alimony between husband and wife did not exist.100
In Roman times divorce was not a disgrace, in spite
of the restrictions.

The dowry system made it possible for

a woman to live without the support of her husband.
The Romans according to modern standards certainly
allowed some unfair practices to exist.

Women seemed to have

been placed on a pedestal which demanded the utmost moral
behavior.

They could be killed for committing adultery

whereas the man received a reprimand of some sort, such as
banishment, the return of the dowry, etc., but certainly
not anything comparable to the loss of one's life.

Even

though Roman women did not play an active role in politics,
it does seem that they could have found a way to change the
law to make the punishment fair for both men and women.
Augustus• legislation concerning adultery was far
from fair.

He did not allow anyone the right to a mistake.

There was no margin for error.

Whatever the attendent cir-

cumstances , if a husband caught his wife in an adulterous
situation he had to initiate divorce.

He had no choice; for

if he chose not to do this, he could then be prosecuted as
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an adulterer himself.

This law certainly seems to be a

weakness in Augustus' legislation, for it allowed no room for
personal choice or for a mistake.

It did not matter whether

or not the husband wished to initiate divorce proceedings.
The choice wasn't his.

It is amazing that the Roman people

accepted this notion and lived by it.

CHAPTER III
TUTELA ET

CURA

"The power of a guardian is the form of family
power which takes the place of paternal power when there is
no one to exercise the latter." lOl There were two kinds of
guardianship:

(i) tutela and (ii) cura.

Both were charged

with care of the person as well as the person's property.
The distinction between the two was in the manner in which
the ward's property was handled. 102
Tutela
In reference to tutela, John Crook says "it originated
as a right of agnate relatives to keep a hold over property
which, if the infant did not grow up and have heirs, was
due to come to them - to see that the inf ant was not cozened
into squandering it; and similarly with the woman sui juris,
to prevent her from disposing of family property. 111 03
The essence of tutela lay in auctoritas interpositio,
i.e. "the assistance which the tutor is required to give

.
. t.ic ac t s t o b e cone 1 u d e d . nl04
in order to enable Juris
Tutela supplies a method by which a person who is incapable
of performing juristic acts is cured of this disability.
42
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Auctoritas interpositio may be accompanied by gestio, i.e.,
the right to make decisions on behalf of the ward which are
necessary for the general management of the property.
Generally, there were two types of tutela:
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(i)

tutela impuberum and (ii) tutela perpetua mulierum.
Permissum est itaque parentibus
hiberos quos in potestate sua
habent testamento tutores dare:
masculini quidem sexus impuberibus . . . que cum nuptae sint.
Veteres enim voluerunt feminas,
etiamsi perfectae aetatis sint,
propter animi levitatem in
tutela esse.106
Every child who was sui iuris and under the age of puberty,
i.e. fourteen, had to have a tutor.

Tutela originally was

considered as an artificial extension of potestas until
the child was capable of potestas for himself.

Tutela was

less in the interest of the child than of the guardian
since the tutor received the property if the ward died
impubes .107
Tutela ended for males when puberty was attained,
but often it was supplemented by devices such as restitutio in integrum and curatio (similar but less protection) •
Itaque si quis f ilio f iliaeque
testamento tutorem dederit, et
ambo ad pubertatem pervenerint,
filius quidem desinit habere
tutorem, £ilia vero nihilo
108
minus in tutela permanent . . .
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Modi Designandi Tutores
Gaius and Justinian classify tutors according to
the method of appointment:
(iii) fiduciarii,

(i) testamentarii,

(ii) legitimi,

(iv) a magistratu daviti.

Tutela Testamentaria.

The XII Tables authorized the pater-

familias to appoint tutors by will to sui heredes impuberes.
Jurists later extended this right to postumi, those not
sui heredes when the will was made but who were born afterwards.

This included children born after the will was made

or after the testator's death, or even grandchildren who
became sui heredes by the death of the father after the
grandfather's will was made. 109
Cum tamen in conpluribus aliis
causis postumi pro iam natis
habeantur, et in hac causa
placuit non minus postumis
quam iam natis testamento
tutores dari posse, si modo in
ea causa sint ut, si vivis
nobis nascuntur in potestate
nostra fiant.
Hos etiam
heredes instituere possumus,
cum extraneos postumos heredes
instituere permissum non sit.110
Ordinarily appointment of a tutor by will was
sufficient, but in certain cases confirmation by a magistrate
was necessary, e.g. if the ward receiving the tutor had been
emancipated.
Sed ei emancipate filio tutor
a patre testamento datus fu~rit,
conf irmandas est ex sentent1a
praesidis omnimodoi id est,
.
.
. . t 'ion e . 11
sine
inqu1s1
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Under Justinian there were no precise rules of form.

A

testator could appoint any one who was persona certa and
testamenti factio (i.e. capable of making a testament), and
it had to be manifest to which child or children he was
appointed.

The appointment might be conditional or from

or to a certain time. 112

A testator could even appoint a

slave simultaneously giving him freedom.

In Justinian's

time mere appointment denoted freedom unless the testator
appointed a slave "cum liber erit."

Otherwise, the appoint-

ment was invalid if the testator did not free the slave or
indicate that he was to be freed at a later date.

The

appointment of another person's slave was invalid i>f the
condition "cum liber erit" were not attached.

The heir was

then bound, if possible, to purchase him and free him. 113
Tutela Legitima.

This type of tutelage was probably older

than the XII Tables.

It represented a primitive notion of

tutela, i.e. the right of potential successors to look after
the estate.

An impubes to whom no tutor had been appointed

by will would have a legitimus or statutory tutor.
were three types of tutela legitima:

There

(i) legitima agnatorum,

(ii) legitima parentum tutela, and (iii) legitima patronorum
tutela.
Legitima Agnatorum Tutela.

According to the XII Tables a

person sui iuris and under the age of puberty and having no
testamentary tutor had as his tutor his nearest agnate or
agnates (if there were

several of the same degree) . ·
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Quibus autem testamento tutor
datus non sit, his ex lege
duodecim tabularum adgnati
sunt tutores, qui vocantur
legi timi. 114
They became tutors because they would become heirs
to the property on death intestate and without issue.
"Ubi successionis est emolumentum ibi et tutelae onus esse
debet." 115

In early law if there were no agnates the

tutelage passed like property to the nearest gentile.

This,

however, disappeared by the beginning of the Empire. 116
After the 118th novel of Justinian,tutela was given to the
nearest cognate capable of being guardian instead of the
nearest agnate.
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Legitima Parentum Tutela.

The paterfamilias who emancipated

a person in potestas and under puberty not only acquired the
right of succession but also became the tutor.
. . . nam si quis filium aut
f iliam, nepotem aut neptem ex
f ilio et deinceps impuberes
emancipaverit legitimus eorum
tutor erit. 118
Legitima Patronorum Tutela.

If a master manumitted a slave

under puberty, then the master and his children after his
119
death became the slave's tutor and patron.
. . . libertorum et libertarum
tutela ad patronos liberosque
eorum pertinet. . . . Eo enim
ipso quod hereditates libertorum
libe~tarumque, si intestati
dicessissent, jusserat lex ad
patronos liberosve eorum.pertinere,
crediderunt veteros voluisse
legem etiam tutelas ad eos
.
120
petinere: · · ·
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Tutela Fiduciaria.

This type of tutela arose when the

emancipation of a child under puberty was made by the
extraneous manumissor who then became the child's tutor
fiduciarius.

This was obsolete in Justinian's time when

the tutela f iduciaria only arose if the paterfamilias
emancipated a person in his potestas who was under puberty,
and then himself died.

Then the unemancipated male children

of the deceased father became fiduciary tutors of the
emancipated person.
. . . nam si parens f ilium vel
f iliam, nepotem vel neptem vel
deinceps impuberes manumiserit,
legitimam naciscitur eorum
tutelam: quo defuncto, si
liberi virilis sexus ei extant,
f iduciarii tutores f iliorum
sudrum, vel fratris vel sororisl21
et ceterorum efficiuntur . . . .
For example, A has two sons, B and C.
age eleven and then becomes his tutor.

A emancipates B at
A dies and C becomes

fiduciary tutor until B attains the age of fourteen. 122
Tutela A Magistratu Dativa.
Si cui nullus omnino tutor sit,
ei datur in urbe Roma ex lege
Atilia a praetore urbano et maiore
parte tribunorum plebis, qui
Atilianus tutor vocatur; in
provinciis vero a praesidibus
provinciarum lege Iulia et
Titia.123
If there were no tutor one was appointed by the
magistrate, but this was not a normal magisteral function.
It existed only because it was expressly created by certain
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legislation.

Some time before 186 B.C. the Lex Atilia was

passed which stated that if an incapable person sui iuris
was without a tutor

at Rome the praetor urbanus should

appoint one with the cooperation of the majority of the
plebian tribunes.

In the provinces this appointment was

made by the praesides under the Lex Julia et Titia (31 B.C.).
This appointment usually occurred if there were no tutor:
or if those which existed were disqualified, excused or
removed.

In later law it was customary to appoint a curator

if a testamentary tutor were temporarily excused.

A tutor

was appointed only if actual auctoritas to some formal act
was needed.
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Vicissitudines Tutelae
The idea of tutela as a public duty was at this
point beginning to supersede the early idea of tutela as an
advantage to the guardian.

Therefore the actio tutelae was

introduced which made the tutor accountable for any loss
the ward had suffered due to the fault of the tutor, whether
.
. a d minis
. . t ering
.
th e es t a t e. 1 2 5
intentional or negligent,
in
This action was a great advance over earlier law in which
the tutor was liable only if he actually embezzled property
of the ward.
The actio tutelae was applicable only in case of
guardianship over impubes.

No action ever developed in the

case of adult women, for the position of the tutor was
different.

If a woman were not in manu she had to have a
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tutor, but guardianship over women was only a burdensome
technicality, remaining from an earlier period.

The woman

administered her own estate and only needed the tutor's permission for certain types of transactions.

Tutors, other

than those holding tute1a legitima, as parents or patrons,
could be forced if necessary to give approval to transactions
which the woman desired.

A method was also developed where-

by a woman could obtain a different tutor if she wished.
To do this, a coemptio fiduciae causa was used; the woman
made a co-emptio with any man she wished and then fell under
his control, manus.

He then mancipated her to whomever she

desired as a tutor; and he who held her in mancipio manumitted
her, thereby becoming her tutor.

This was performed in the

same manner as a man who manumitted a female slave and then
became her tutor.

It was also possible for the husband

while in the process of appointing by will a tutor for his
wife in manu to let her choose the individual she desired
. d 126
and even to change as o f ten as She d es1re .

The unreal-

ity of tutelae of adult women in classical law is evident
by the number of devices for changing one's tutor.
Nominatio Tutoris
Any friend or relative could initiate the appointment of a tutor when needed and where applicable.

If no

one initiated an appointment, creditors and others might
give notice for them to apply; and if the tutorless defaulted,
they could apply to the magistrate.
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Anyone who was appointed tutor had a public duty
to serve unless he met certain disqualifications or acceptable excuses.

Modestinus applies the rules to all tutors,

but classical law stated that the excuses applied only to
legitimi or fiduciary tutors.
Excusationes.

Excuses had to be pleaded before the officer

in charge of tutorial appointments and within limits of time
dependent on distance from the location of court.
of excuse were numerous.

The grounds

General grounds were age, perman-

ent ill health, ignorance, poverty, exile, the occupying of
a high office, having a certain number of natural born children and holding three substantially independent guardianships.
Special grounds might be litigation or hostility between
the involved parties or remoteness of residence.

Sometimes,

the grounds for excuse were temporary.
One who had promised the father that he could serve
as tutor could not later excuse himself.

A libertus appoint-

ed by a magistrate to his patron's child could not plead
an excuse, but if he were appointed by the patron's

will

to be a collibertus he could then plead an excuse to prevent
confirmation of the appointment by the magistrate.

Any per-

son appointed by the father as tutor, whether subject to
confirmation or not, claiming an excuse lost any benefit
under the father's will, apart from testator's indication
'to the contrary.
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Impedimenta.

There were several restrictions placed on

tutorial appointments.
be a tutor.

(i)

Generally, a woman could not

However, in A. D. 390 this was changed.

If

there were no legitimus or testamentary tutor, a mother if
she desired could be appointed tutor provided she took an
oath not to remarry.

If she did remarry, the tutela ended

and her husband might be sued on liabilities already accrued.
(ii)

To be under the age of twenty-five was an excuse in

classical law but not at the time of Justinian.

Being an

impubes was always a disqualification except for legitimi
tutelae,and Justinian made it an excuse for all cases.
(iii)

Deaf or dumb persons could not be tutores, except

legitimi in classical law, and Justinian excluded them altogether.

Lunacy was only a temporary excuse instead of a

disqualification, for lunacy was considered curable.

During

classical law there was no bar at all for legitima tutela.
(iv)

Some persons due to their station or function could

not be tutors.

Milites and certain officials could not

be tutores even if they were willing, and there were certain
cases in which a person of one class could not be appointed
to one of another class.

(v)

Misconduct was not an abso-

lute disqualification but would come under consideration
.

.

during a magistrate's inquiry prior

t

. t

t

o appoin men .
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Off icia Tutoris
The duties of the tutor were numerous.

In some

cases he had to give security, ~ salvam pupillo fore.
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Security was not required of a testamentary tutor or of one
confirmed or appointed by superior magistrates after an inquiry.

If the tutor was a patron or patron's filius and

if the estate were small and the tutor a man of substance
and probity, the security might be remitted.

If security

were required, the acts of the tutor did not bind the pupil
un t i·1 th e securi·ty h a db een provi'd e d . 128
Administratio.

The first step in the actual administration

of tutela was the inventory of the estate.
so resulted in heavy liabilities.

Failure to do

Under Justinian the tutor

could be released from this inventory by the testator from
whom the property came.
The tutor was required to provide out of the estate
an appropriate sum for the maintenance of the child.

The

magistrate sometimes would determine the appropriate amount.
The real business of the tutor was with the patrimonium and there were three functions:

(i)

the management,

improvement, and preservation of the ward's estate,
the education and general care of the ward,

(iii)

(ii)
the

acting on behalf of the ward or co-operating with him in
130
order to import 1 ega 1 Vall. di'ty to his acts.
The tutor had to care for the ward's property and be
watchful for its increase as if it were his own.

If a

guardian failed to make the obvious gains, he was liable
within two months of assuming duties to make good the loss;
and if he were not financially able to do so, he was liable

129
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for judicial punishment under the old law.

But Justinian

allowed them to gradually replace the loss unless the ward's
. . 0 ns f or necessary su b sis
. t ence h a d b een 1mpa1re
.
. d .131
Prov1s1

In A. D. 195 Severus forbade tutores to sell lands
except by direction of will or of magisterial authorization
in case of emergency.

Even though alienation was forbidden,

the tutor was still entitled to sell unproductive or perishable moveables, urban property, and urban slaves.

He was

bound to sell it if the interest of the ward's property required it.

This system was not completely satisfactory.

Therefore, Constantine forbade
surburban

propert~

the tutor to sell urban

or

or valuable moveables except in circum-

stances which justified the sale of rustica

pra~dia.

The tutor had to make every effort to recover debts
due to the ward.

He must invest the ward's money within a

certain time, and if he delayed he was liable for the lost
.
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interest.

Auctoritas interpositio was the co-operation of
the tutor with the ward.

An act was done by the ward with

the auctoritas of the tutor.

The authority involved the

presence of the tutor, for the tutor had to orally declare
his approval.

A child was not legally able to act until he

had reached a certain level of development; he must have
intellectus.
wisdom.

The tutor then simply provided judgement and

until the fifth century infantia meant the in-

capacity to speak, but in A. D. 407 the limit of infantia
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was fixed at seven years.

After a child reached the age of

seven he had mental intelligence but not judgment.

There-

fore, the tutor added auctoritas to the ward's actions, thus
making them legal and binding for both the ward and the person with whom he dealt.

The authority of the tutor was not

necessary in two instances:
from obligations and (ii)

(i)

the release of the ward

the acquisition by the ward of

rights of inheritance or succession.
A tutor could not authorize any acts in which he had
an interest.

If he were the sole tutor,no such transaction

was possible unless a tutor praetorius was appointed for
the purpose of authorizing it.

However, if there were

other tutors one of these could authorize the transaction.
Not all transactions needed auctoritas;

the ward could per-

form transactions which would benefit him but not bind him
even if the transaction bound the other party.

But if the

transaction bound the ward then the auctoritas of the tutor
was necessary. 133
Causae Tutelae Terminandae
There were many ways by which a tutela ended.

Tutela

ended if there occurred the death, capitis deminutio or
puberty of the ward, or if the date or event till which the
tutor had been appointed occurred.

The completion of the

purpose for a temporary tutor also ended the tutela.

The

death, capitis deminutiol34 (maxima or media) of the tutor,
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i. e. the loss of caput, or a supervening ground of exemption
ended the tutela.

Capitis deminutio minima of a tutor was

applicable only for tutores legitimi.

The tutela would

end and pass to the person with the next civil law right of
succession.
A tutor was liable for misconduct.

If a crimen

suspecti tutoris occurred then there may be a petition for
the tutor's removal based on the XII Talbes.

He would be

tried before the chief magistrate of the district.

Any one

might bring the petition except the impubes himself.
Immediately on accusation a tutor was suspended
from acting.

Removal had no definite grounds and, therefore,

was at the discretion of the court.

If the evidence showed

dolus,the tutor became infamis (but not for incompetence or
negligence).

The proceeding ended if the tutor died or the

tutela otherwise ended.

The misconduct had to have occurred

during the tutela, but in later law it might have been before
135
the actual administration.
A guardian was also liable for fraud, neglect, or
the waste of the ward's property.

He could not alienate the

ward's property for malfeasance (crimen suspecti).

If he

wasted or alienated the ward's property, he could be removed.
He was also liable to double the value fine or restitution
to the ward when he reached the age of majority or upon his
own removal.
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If there were several tutors, it was possible for all
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to administer but it was not convenient.

If there were sev-

eral testamentary tutors the auctoritas of one sufficed
except in a matter which would end the tutela.

The tutors

might administer in command,or they might arrange privately
to a distribution of power and control in which case those
not acting were liable only in the last resort.
Removal of a tutor was not a remedy but a prevention of future damage.

However, there were remedies against

tutores who failed in their obligations.

(i)

Actio de

rationibus distrahendis was an action which lay against any
tutor at the termination of the tutela.

Essentially, it

was delicatal, giving double damages and available to but
not against the heredes.

It dates from XII Tables and prob(ii) Actio

ably originally applied to the legitimi tutores.

tutelae dates from the Republic and gave remedy for any
breach of duty.

This remedy was applicable only at the end

of a tutela, and condemnation involved infamia.

Originally

it was used only for maladministration; therefore, it was
not applicalbe if the tutor refused to act at all.

How-

ever, during the first century of the Empire the law was
changed; and a tutor became responsible if he were ordered
to act by a magisterial decre~ and in the second century
inaction was practically equal to maladministration.
The ward's claim took precedence over any other
unsecured debts of the tuto4 and during later law the ward
had tacita hypotheca.

This action was available to and

57

against'the heredes.

After the accounts were settled, a

tutor could deduct what had been properly spent out of his
own funds.

If a problem arose, the tutor had recourse to
'

actio contraria tutelae whereby he could claim reimbursement.
The ward had other remedies for maladministration.
If security had been given, action lay against this or the
promise of the tutor and those of his sureties but not till
the end of the tutela.

An action also lay against inferior

magistrates who had not properly or adequately exacted the
required security.

However, they were liable only as a

last resort and only if they had not taken necessary precautions and reasonable security at that time.
If there were several tutors, each was liable in
actio de rationibus distrahendis but only for his own malversation.

If they all acted in common they were all liable

in actio tutelae.

If they acted individually, then those

not acting were liable last.
An action also lay against a protutor (a person who
acted as tutor but not by a valid appointment), and it could
be initiated even by third persons who had suffered loss due
to the intervention of such a one not qualified to give
auctoritas.
Cura
The essence of cura lay in gestio*.

*cf. p. 43 for definition.

The curator
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had no auctoritas interpositio;

therefore, he could not

enable an incapable person in concluding a juristic act.
There were three types of cura:

(i)

cura minoris,

(ii)

cura furiosi and (iii) cura prodigi.
Cura Minoris
As early as the middle Republic it was obvious that
the ending of tutela over males at the age of fourteen left
them in a precarious position, for they did not yet have
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the maturity to be in sole control of their fortunes.
The XII Tables did not provide any protection for those who
had attained the age of fourteen.
tury B. C. the lex

Plaetori~

Thus in the second cen-

or as often written lex Laetoria,

was introduced which gave an action to anyone of either sex
below the age of twenty-five against persons whom they
claimed to have defrauded them.

Following this the praetor

offered a remedy in which a restitutio in integrum should
occur whenever one under twenty-five years of age had been
defrauded.

In addition, if one defrauded a person under

twenty-five he was then liable to criminal prosecution and
infamy.
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As a result of this, transactions with minors

were performed very hesitantly unless they had someone with
them to sanction their actions.

Therefore, it became quite

common for minors to apply to the proper authorities for a
curator or guardian to authorize their actions until they
reached the perfecta

aetas of twenty-five years.

It was

not obligatory for one who attained puberty to have a curator,
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but if he had much property it was the tutor's duty to encourage him to apply.
Item inviti adolescentes curatores
non accipiunt, praeterquam in litem;
curator enim et ad certam causam
dari potest. 139
A curator was appointed not only when a law suit was
involved, but also when a debtor wished to pay a debt

o~ed

to the youth or the tutor wished to settle his accounts
with the youth.

The curator, once he had been appointed

held the office until the ward was twenty-five years of
age.

An exception to this was possible by a special grant

of the emporer if the curator felt the ward was capable
of managing his own affairs, but it was necessary that the
man be at least twenty and the woman eighteen. 140
Cura Furiosi Et Prodigi
According to the XII Tables the protection of lunatics and spendthrifts vested in the nearest agnate though
later a curator could be appointed by the authorities.

In

both cases a man's relatives could get complete control over
his property against his will, and yet according to Crook we
do not know what the ancients used as their criteria for
determining whether one was a lunatic or a spendthrift.
Furiosi quoque et prodigi, licet
majores viginti quinque annis sint,
tamen in curatione sunt adgnatotum
ex lege duodecim tabularum; sed solent
Romae praefectus urbis vel praetor,
et in provinciis praesides ex
inquisitione eis curatores dare.141
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The curator of the furiosus ceased to act during
the lucid intervals of the furiosus, for he was considered
to have the capacity to act on his own. In early law there
seems to be some doubt as to whether the curator needed
a reappointment during the non-lucid periods or whether a
new curator was appointed.

Howeve~

in later

law the curator

did not need a reappointment on the relapse of the furiosus.
There is little information available as to the powers of the curator of the prodigus. The prodigus was often
able to execute on his own acts which could not harm the
estate.

Otherwise, the consent of the curator was always

necessary.

The appointment seems to have been continuous

until the appointment was officially removed.

Also placed

under curatorship,in addition to those of unsound mind,were
those of physical disabilities which would interfere with
the managing of their own affairs.
Sed et mente captis, et surdis,
et mutis, et qui perpetuo morbo
laborant, quia rebus suis superesse
non possunt, curatores dandi sunt.142
The function of the curator differed from that of
the tutor, but many similarities between the two existed.
The rules as to whom the magistrate appointed, the security
given, excuses, reasons for removal, restrictions on power,
and the reasons for termination were in later law mostly
the same.

For this reason a separate discussion of these

matters will not appear in this paper.
The role of curatorship of minors seems to be
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unnecessary.

The reason this position existed was because

many felt that a boy of fourteen was not yet ready to
manage his own estate.

Why didn't the Romans extend the

age one was under tutelage unless they felt curatorship was
a stepping stone from tutelage to manhood and independence.
Another perplexing situation was the situation in
which a father emancipates a son in potestas and then becomes his tutor.

Why would a father do this?

if the son needs a tutor he is under fourteen.
the father wait?

Obviously,
Why wouldn't

Possibly he felt death was at hand and

wanted his son independent when that time came.

By his

son being independent, taxes might possibly be lowered.
Whatever the reason, it must have been advantageous.
Another problem seems to exist between the father
and son.

Why would a father appoint a slave as a tutor to

his son?

The slave would certainly have to be

specia~

for

it seems that most slaves due to their station in life
would not have the expertise to handle one's estate, unless
he had been taught business matters by the paterfamilias.
But it does seem odd that a slave would be appointed over
a family member unless there was no one in the family who
was qualified.
As evident in this paper the institution of tutela
and cura was a most complex one.

The role of tutor or cura-

tor was considered a public duty; and, therefore, it could not
be lightly refused.
work the utmost

In order for this aspect of law to

co-operation of Roman citizens was
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requisite, but why would one undertake such a responsibility?
Certainly the administration and caring of another's estate
was an immense task, and in addition the tutor or curator
was answerable for maladministration.
and burden!

What a responsibility

The institution however was a necessary one in

order that proper care of estates would exist.

Even though

the guardians - if they were agnates - might benefit, still
the responsibility was tremendous.

But the guardians

were certainly aware of the fact that someone in their f amily might one day be in a position which required a tutor
or curator.

This fact would certainly make one more agree-

able and acceptable to a guardian's duties.

CHAPTER IV
ADOPTIO ET ADROGATIO
Adoption was an extremely important aspect of Roman
law.

"A well known feature of the social history of Rome

is the infertility of the governing class, its failure to
rear enough children to maintain its numbers." 14 3
were many reasons for this situation:

There

disease and the ensu-

ing high death rate, the lack of interest of women in childbearing, etc.

The remedy for the lack of family was adoption,

and the primary purpose of adoption was to keep a family
from becoming extinct.

The welfare of the children was not

a primary concern; in fact, often those adopted were adults.
Charles Sherman says that adoption was probably earlier in
Roman law than wills,but the purpose of both was the same:
"to avoid the extinction of a family by death of its head
without heirs.

Hence the endeavor of the law to provide

.
b y an art1' f 'icia
. 1 re 1 ations
.
h'ip. 11145
fictitious heirs

Ad op-

tion was quite essential to the pagan Romans; for if there
were no heirs, it prevented the family's religious worship,
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the

sacra,* from extinguishing.

ligious rites were perpetuated.

Through adoption the reThis desire for family

continuity was very powerful at Rome, and for this reason
the Romans felt that if the bond existing between a father
and a son could be broken by emancipation it could also be
146
created be adoption.
In Republican times there were two entirely different forms of adoption:

adoptio and adrogatio.

Through adoptio a person who is
under the paternal power of the
head of his family comes under
the patria potestas of another
(adoptator, pater adoptivus).
The change of family (mutatio
familiae) is the characteristic
feature of the adoptio, while in
an adrogatio, i.e., the adoption
of a person sui iuris who is himself the head of a family, there
is a fusion of two families since
the adrogatus enters into another
family together with all persons
subject to his paternal power.
The legal effects are equal in
both cases; the adopted persons have
the same rights (succession) and
duties (sacra) as natural sons.147
The modes of these two types of adoption also differed.
According to Gaius,
sui iuris sunt:

11

Populi auctoritate adoptamus eos qui

quae species adoptionis dicitur adrogatio

. Imperio magistratus adoptamus eos qui in potestate
parentum sunt.

11148

According to Aulus Gellius:

Quod per praetorem fit, adoptatio
dicitur, quod per populum arragotio.

* Sacra - i.e. the worship of both a deity and ancestors of the family.
These rites were performed by heirs not only natural descendants of last head of family but even
by heirs through adoption.

65
adoptantur autem, cum a parente
in cuius potestate sunt tertia
mancipatione in iure ceduntur
atque ab eo qui adoptat apud
eum legis actio est vindicantur:
adrogantur hi qui, cum sui iuris
sunt in alienam sese potestatem
tradunt eius que rei ipsi auctores
fiunt.149
Adoptio
Adoptio was a mode of acquiring patria potestas
over persons not born into the family.

In adoptio, a person

under one potestas was given into another's potestas, and
the adopted were under the same paternal power as natural
children.

No specific declaration seems to have been required

for the adoption of a son already under potestas i.e.
termed alieni iuris.

one

The child became property, through

.
t 10,
'
mancipa
o f th e new owner. 150
An elaborate form of adoption existed which was

derived from the XII Tables stating that if a father sold
his son three times (mancipatio) the son was free from his
father's power.
The father, A, sold X, the son,
to B, B freed him and he reverted
to A's potestas. This was repeated.
Then there was a third sale which
destroyed the potestas and left the
son in bondage to B. C, the intending
adopter, now brought a conclusive ac- 151
tion against B claiming X as his son.
Since there was no defense, the judge decided in favor of

c.

B and C could be the same person but then X went back.

to A after the third sale, and the claim was then made against

A.
If a paterfamilias gave his daughter or granddaughter
in adoption one sale was sufficient.

The sale was performed
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by a formal mancipio.

The transaction had two parts, a

preliminary sale which destroyed the potestas and the act
of adoption, i. e. the claim and declaration in court.
Justinian made the adoption of alieni juris simple.
Instead of the elaborate ceremony just described, he substituted a simple proceeding of executing a deed in magisterial
presence declaring adoption.

The parties involved (i.e. the

persons given, giving, and receiving) had to be present
to give their consent.

But it was also sufficient if the
.
153
.
person being adopted did not dissent.
Adoption affected
only the adoptee - if the adoptee already had children they
remained in the old family.
It was possible to adopt one's own child no longer
in one's potestas,

even though the child had been given to

another previously in adoption.

But a son so adopted was

a new person; he was no longer the father of any children
he had left behind.

An adoptive child might be emancipated
154
or given in adoption, but he could not be readopted.
Justinian greatly altered the laws on adoption.
Since adoption could be lighly undertaken and lightly ended,
Justinian provided safeguards for the adoptee lest he discover that he was free and not belonging to any family due
to emancipation.

Justinian provided that the adoptee retain

his rights of succession in the old family which he often
lost under the old law.

As a member of the new family he

would acquire only a right of succession if the adoptive
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father died intestate, and no right of complaint if he were
bypassed l·n a w1·11. 155

Th e a d op t'1ve f a th er, un l'k
1 e th e

natural father, was not bound to leave the adopted son a
share of the estate if he made a will.

The adoptee in

Justinian's time did not pass into the potestas of the
adoptive father.

The type of adoption just discussed
156
Justinian referred to as adoptio minus plena.
In this
type of adoption the adoptee passed into the physical control of the adopting person but legally remained a member of
his old agnatic family.

The only legal effect was that the

child acquired a chance of intestate succession to the adopter.
This was a drastic change, for prior to Justinian, adoption
placed the adoptee in the exact position he would have had
had he been born into his adopted family.
Sed hodie, ex nostra constitutione,
cum f iliusf amilias a patre naturali
extraneae personae in adoptionem
datur, jura potestatis patris naturalis
minime dissolvuntur, nee quicquam ad
patrem adoptivum transit, nee in potestate eius est, licet ab intestate
jura successionis ei a nobis tribute
sint. 158
The old law prevailed under Justinian if the adopted son
were given to a natural descendant or ascendant (e.g. the
grandfather of the adopted child) .

Justinian referred to

this type of adoption in which the old law of succession
prevailed

as adoptio plena.

An adoptive son could only

enter the family of his maternal grandfather per adoptionem.
And if the adoptive son were born after the father was emancipate~

he would not be in the same family of his paternal

15
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grandfather except by adoption.

The adoptive son may even

be adopted by his natural father, for if he were born before
his father was emancipated then the grandfather may have
emancipated his father but not him

and then later might give

him to his father per adoptionem. 159
A person could adopt one as a grandson, granddaughter, great-grandson or great-granddaughter or any other descendant even if he had no son.
Licet autem et in locum nepotis
vel neptis vel in locum pronepotis
vel proneptis vel deinceps adoptare,
quamvis fitium quis non habeat.160
According to the system of paterfamilias, it seems
that to have a grandson in one's power one must have a son
as the sons of daughters do not fall under the same paterfamilias.

However, the maternal grandfather could adopt.

For marriage it often made a difference whether one was adopted as a grandson or great-grandson, for the natural granddaughter of the adopter would be cousin or neice of the
adopted depending on whether one was adopted as son or grandson and could marry him in one case but not the other.
A man could also adopt the son of another as his
grandson and could adopt the grandson of another as his son.
He could also adopt a grandson to be given as a son to any
son provided that son's consent were given, for the adopted
would then become an heir of the son's and not of the adopter.161

on the contrary if a grandfather gives his grandson

162
by a son in adoption, the consent of the son is not necessary.
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Conditiones Adoptionis
Certain conditions had to be met in order for adoption
to occur.

The parties involved must be of the requisite

age, i. e. eighteen years and there must be a required
number of intervening years, i. e. eighteen years.

Accord-

ing to Justinian a younger person could not adopt an older
person.

The principle adoptio naturam imitatur was the

guiding

principle for adoption.
Minorem natu non posse maiorem
adoptare placet: adoptio enim
naturam imitatur et pro monstro
est, ut maior sit filius quam
pater. Debet itaque is, qui sibi
per adrogationem vel adoptionem
filium facit, plena pubertate,
id est decem et octo annis praecedere. 163

The principle adoptio naturam imitatur applied in several
other instances also:

(i)

In Cicero's time, an unmarried

man could not adopt, 164 but in later law an adopter did not
have to be married.

A castratus could not adopt, for nature

could never give him children.

An impotent

person however

could adopt, for nature could possibly cure the impotency.
Illud vero utriusque adoptionis
commune est, quod et hi generare
non possunt, quales sunt spadones,
adoptare possunt.165
(ii)

Women initially were not able to adopt, because they

were incapable of patria potestas.

According to an inter-

polated constitution dated 291 A. D. Diocletian allowed a
woman who had lost her own children to adopt as a means of
consolation, but she still did not have patria potestas over
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them.

Justinian allowed this type of adoption provided the

Emporer's permission was given.

In the constitution the

woman apparently was sui juris, but Justinian's law did not
have this limitation.166
Feminae quoque adoptare non possunt,
quia nee naturales liberos in sua
potestate habent. Sed ex indulgentia
principis ad solatium liberorurn
amissorum adoptare possunt.167
Adrogatio
In adrogatio a person sui juris and independent became alieni juris by placing himself under the potestas of
another citizen.

This institution was older than adoptio

and was very importan4 for it destroyed one family and merged it with another.

Though this form underwent certain

changes during Roman

histor~

its effect and tone were un-

altered.
Originally there was a preliminary inquiry by pontiffs
as to whether the case or request was admissable and satisfied certain legal requirements.

If approved, the case was

then sent before the comitia curiata,in this case called the
comitia calata,which met on special days for this and other
business affecting sacra.
the Pontifex Maximus. 168

The meeting was presided over by
Originally no woman or Roman sub-

ject could introduce an adrogation procedure, for they did
not have access to the assembly. 169

The reason for the approval

of the assembly and the religious authorities is easy to
understand since a family was extinguished and merged with

71
another.

The adoptive family may have consisted of just

the adrogatus or if he held a family in potestas they also
merged with him.

A provision might have had to be made for

the continuation of the religious cult for the sake of the
ancestors.

Therefore,adrogation was of special interest

to the pontiffs. 170
There is no actual proof that adrogatio existed at
the time of the XII Tables but it is assumed, for the use
of comitia curiatia (which ceased to function in the eary
republic) certainly indicates that adrogatio existed prior
to the XII Tables.171
The parties involved in the adrogation procedure
were rogati and they were asked if they consented.

Follow-

ing this was a rogatio of the populus which was probably
followed by detestatio sacrorum - the renunciation by the
adrogatus of the sacra of his old family. 172

If all went

accordingly, an act was passed making the person adrogated
a member of his new family and extinguishing the old family.
Then the person adrogated passed into the potestas of the
person adrogating and lost all his ancient religious rites
(sacra).

Adrogatio brought the adrogatus completely

the family.

into

He became a filiusfamilias and brought both

all those who had been under his potestas and all of his
property.
After the comitia· curiata lost its power, the citizens were represented by thirty lictors.

The judicial inqui-

ry was still held,and the consent of the parties was still
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necessary.

Diocletian changed the form so that all that was

requisite was a rescript of the emporer which continued
until Justinian. 173
Rescriptiones
There were certain restrictions placed on adrogatio:
(i)

since adrogatio destroyed a family, it was allowed o!'lly

to save another family - i. e. to provide heres.

Therefore,

there was very careful investigation and legislative con(ii)

sent.

If the adrogation was done through the comitia,

it had to occur at Rome where the comitia sat.

It could

be done anywhere by an imperial rescript after Diocletian's
change.

(iii)

A woman could not be adrogated, having no

standing before the

comiti~but

if the adrogation was per-

formed by an imperial rescript it was legal.

However, the

advantage was small; although she continued her family for her
generation she had no heres.

(iv)

In early law an impubes

could not be adrogated, for it placed an easily misused
power in the hands of the tutores,

for they would then have

the means to avoid accounting for the administration of the
ward's estate.

Antoninus Pius allowed it in certain cases

after a careful inquiry concerning the possible advantages
to the child.
the

adrogator

The auctoritas of the tutor was required and
gave security that if the adrogatus died while

still an impubes his property would be restored to those
who would have had it had he not been adrogated.

If the

adrogatus was emancipated while still an impubes, the adrogator
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had to restore the property immediately.

If the adrogator

disinherited the adrogatus, the adrogatus could claim his
own property at the adrogator's death.

If the adrogator

had emancipated the adrogatus without revealing the reason
to the court and later died, the adrogatus could claim onefourth of the adrogatus' estate (quarta antonina).

This

was what an only child could claim of a father's estate unless he had been justly disinherited.

The liabilities were

probably covered by the security given earlier.

When the

adrogatus reached puberty the securities and liabilities
ended.

However, the adrogatus could have the adrogatio set

aside by a forced emancipatio - if he could show sufficient
reason. 174

(v)

Adrogation was used only as a last resort

to save a familY, and a person could only adrogate once.

(vi)

A person in order to adrogate must be at least sixty years
of age and unlikely to have children.

(vii)

One under

twenty-five could not be adrogated by a former tutor or
curator.

All of these restrictions could be overridden if

the reasons were justified.
controlling authorities.

It lay in the discretion of the

An adrogatio which broke these

. d out. 175
rules was va l i'd i' f actua 11 y carr1e
Modi Adrogationis
Some dispute exists as to when adrogation was first
made per rescriptum principis.

Ulpian says that by his time

adrogation was made per populum (i. e. curies represented by
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lictors) and not by imperial rescript.

Ulpian further says

adrogation could only occur at Rome, but when the use of
.
. 1 rescript
.
.
imperia
was introduced
t h e p 1 ace d"d
i
not matter. 176
It is known that in the time of Justinian the Roman forms
of adoptio were abolished and replaced by declarations re.
d in
. t h e arc h"ives o f court in
. t h e muncipa
. l"ity. 177
gistere
Adoption by the rescript of the emperor insisted
that a person having his own children not only gives himself
in adrogation but also submits to the adrogator's control
his own children.

The children are then considered to be

the grandchildren of the adrogator.

For this reason Augus-

tus did not adopt Tiberius until Tiberius adopted Germanicus,
and thus upon Tiberius adoption Germanicus became Augustus'
grandson. 178
will.

Adrogation also could be performed through a

It was in this way that Julius Caesar adopted Augustus.

Probably this method had to be approved by an act of the
comitia curiata. 179
Before Justinian all the property of the person adrogated became the property of the adrogator, but Justinian
changed it so the adrogator acquired only a life use of the
property of the adrogatus.

Originally the debts of the

adrogatus were wiped out upon adrogation, but in Justinian's
time the adrogator had.to pay the debts lest the creditors
could claim the assets of the adrogatus.
tion for interested third parties.

This was a protec-

In some cases where the

adrogator did not meet an action arising out of debts incurred
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before adrogation,the praetor authorized a bonorum venditio
(sale of adrogator's property in bulk) up to the amount of the
adrogatus' original contribution plus any subsequent additions
made through him. 180
Similitudines Inter Adoptionem
Et Adrogationem
The similarities between adoption and adrogation are
many, to mention a few:

(i)

Both the adoptee and adrogatus

changed families although the prior status of each differed.
The former was alieni juris while the later was sui juris.
(ii)

Both the adrogator and adopter had to be eighteen

years of age.

(iii)

It was impossible for one to adopt

or adrogate if castrated.

(iv)

In early law women could

neither adopt nor adrogate since a woman was the end of the
family.

Later, however, a woman was allowed to adopt as a so-

lace for lost children.
The institution of adoption and adrogation is a very
complex one.

Adoptions to a large extent were arranged for

political or practical reasons.

In most cases adoption prob-

ably lacked the emotional tie with which we are so accustomed.
Because of its importance to the Roman people, they devised
many ways to ensure benefits for all concerned; but as a result of these complex machinations, problems were inevitable.
For example, for what reason would one adopt a person as a
grandchild or great-grandchild rather than a child of the
first degree of ascendancy, especially when there were no heirs
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of the first degree?

The obvious answer would seem to be

for inheritance reasons - i. e. the one adopted or adrogated
may inherit more by avoiding certain taxes as a result of not
being of the first degree.
Another perplexing problem was that in later Roman
times women were allowed to adopt in a special circumstance
i. e. as a solace for lost children.
ed?

But why was this allow-

The children did not enter the woman's potestas; the

family ended with the woman.

This seems to be of a disad-

vantage to the children unless they remained legally a part
of their old family; or possibly they fell under the potestas
of the adoptive paternal grandfather, although this is not
indicated.
One was allowed to adopt or adrogate and then in
turn give the adoptive person or adrogatus to his own son in
adoption.

The reason this was allowed seems to be confusing.

Possibly it was allowed because the son was in potestas
of his own father; and, therefore, could not initiate an adoptive
procedure on his own behalf.
There are many suppositions one could suggest as
to the why's of Roman adoptive procedures.

There are many

unanswered questions and many blanks and fragments as a
result of little primary information.
are of immeasurable

importanc~

Gaius and Justinian

but much of their writing

has been interpolated and revised so that it would be relevant for their day.

It is regrettable that there occurs a
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lack of primary information in such an area that affects us
greatly - for much of our own legal system is influenced by
Roman law.
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